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Abstract
This paper studies how simultaneously liberalizing trade and tightening environmental policy
affect welfare in a second-best world. We consider a three-good two-factor small open
economy. We allow for non-tradables and for market power in the export market. The
government is constrained to balance its budget at all times through distortionary taxes: a given
income transfer has to be financed out of tariff and pollution tax revenue. We show that the
switch from trade tariffs to environmental taxes can yield an increase in real income thus
providing a second dividend in addition to the environmental improvement.
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1. Introduction
Over the last half century the world trading system has been considerably liberalised. Initially,
only the advanced industrialised countries with harrowing memories of the inter-war period
participated in the liberalisation process but the developing countries have joined them in the
last two decades. About this time environmental protection has also become a big issue at least
in the OECD countries. Free trade and environmental protection could be at loggerheads in a
wide variety of situations. The world trading system is addressing these issues, albeit
tentatively. 
There are environmentalists who claim that protecting the environment may improve
the efficiency of the economic system. Environmental levies could help reduce distortionary
taxation and thus generate a double dividend (DD). The DD hypothesis has spawned a large
literature in the 1990's which tries to examine the conditions under which such a DD would
hold.1 Anyway the improvement in the environmental quality plus a possible second dividend
in terms of a more efficient economic system, makes environmentalists very gung ho about
pursuing the clean up of the environment.
In the developing countries, on the other hand, some of this environmental activism in
the West has been viewed with trepidation. The less developed countries while cleaning up
their act in the production of traded goods--that is what the consumer in the West wants--have
protested that environmental protection in the OECD countries is nothing but a form of
protectionism. The market power that the industrial countries ceded at the GATT and WTO
have been recaptured through interventionism on the environment front. An environmental levy
could improve the terms of trade of the OECD countries and raise welfare of the
environmentally conscious economy.
Given the importance of this matter it is surprising that the DD hypothesis has not been
examined in a trade context. We pursue this issue in this paper and show that a DD in a
country with market power in trade arises as the trading partner sees its terms of trade
worsening.
This paper examines whether a double dividend may arise in small open economies that
rely mainly on tariff revenue to finance government expenditure. It turns out that the conditions
for a double dividend to arise depend crucially on the elasticity of foreign demand. Another
important determinant is the size of the non-tradables sector. Relatively open economies in
which the share of imported goods in consumption is large are more likely to gain from
shifting taxes from trade to the environment. The prospects for a double dividend in developing
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countries are bleak therefore: they lack enough monopoly power in foreign markets and the
share of the tradables sector is too small.
We develop an open economy trade model with three goods and two factors in the next
section. In section 3, the home country produces non-tradables and exportables only, that is,
there is no import-competing sector. It can affect the price of its exports. Analytical solutions
of the linearized model for the Cobb-Douglas case are presented in section 3.2. Numerical
examples in section 3.3 show that the same mechanisms happen in more general cases. Section
4 focusses on the role of an import-competing sector. If tradables production of the economy
is not fully specialized in exportables, the double dividend fails irrespective of the elasticity
of foreign demand. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains some technical details.
2. The model
We consider an economy with two production factors and three goods. The first factor, labour,
is fixed in supply. The second production factor is a polluting input. We equate total use of
polluting inputs to total emissions in the economy, so that we also refer to emissions as the
second factor of production. Total emissions are controlled by government policy, either
through a system of tradable pollution permits or through a pollution tax. 
One of the three goods, n, is a non-tradable. The other two goods, x and y, are traded.
Good x is the exportable good. No other country is producing a perfect substitute so the
domestic country holds some monopoly power in the world market for this good. Good y can
be either domestically produced or imported. The domestic economy is too small to affect the
price of this good in the world market. Because of this combination of market power in the x
sector and given prices in all other international markets, we label the economy as a "semi-
small" open economy. 
This section lays out the structure of the model. In the following sections, we consider
in turn the case in which the domestic economy completely specializes in good x and has no
import-competing sector and the case in which it produces both tradables x and y. 
Firms and factor markets
We distinguish three production sectors, denoted by j = n, x, y for nontradables, exportables
and import-competing production. In all sectors, individual firms take output prices pj as given
(perfect competition) and maximize profits subject to a neoclassical production function
Fj(Lj,Ej). The function exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to labour (Lj) and










where W and T are the wage and price of polluting inputs respectively. Due to constant returns
to scale and perfect competition, total revenue equals factor payments:
j = n,x,y (1.3)pj j ' W Lj % T Ej
Firms' total demand for labour and polluting inputs are given by:
, (1.4)j Lj ' L
. (1.5)j Ej ' E
In equilibrium, L equals the exogenous supply of labour. Total demand for polluting inputs is
controlled by the government's environmental policy (see below).
Households
Utility of the representative household depends on consumption of the three goods, cj, j =
n,x,y. We assume that the utility function is homothetic and weakly separable in non-tradables
and tradables: U(cn,ct(cx,cy)). Households maximize utility subject to the following budget
constraint:
, (1.6)j pj cj ' WL % G




where the Lagrange multiplier 8 denotes the marginal utility of income.
Foreign households solve a similar maximization problem. Our assumption is that the
home economy can affect foreign prices of good x only. The following first order condition






The asterisk denotes foreign values. 
Market clearing and trade
Equilibrium in the goods markets requires that domestic consumption equals domestic
production for non-tradables, that production equals the sum of domestic and foreign demand
for exportables x, and that production matches the excess domestic demand cy over imports m
for importables y: 
, (1.9)n ' cn
, (1.10)x ' cx % c
(
x
. (1.11)y ' cy & m
Trade balance requires equality between export earnings and import payments:




* is the world market price of y.
Government
The government levies a tariff t on imports. This raises the domestic price py above world
market price py
*:
. (1.13)py ' (1%t)p
(
y
The government controls emissions by charging a price (pollution tax) T per unit of emission
(uniform across sectors). Total revenue from tariffs and pollution taxes are used to finance
transfers to households G. Hence, the budget constraint of the government reads:
. (1.14)tp (y m % TE ' G
The government has three instruments, t, T, and G. We focus on the first two of these
instruments. In particular, we study whether an increase in the pollution tax T creates the room
for a reduction in the tariff and whether this trade liberalization improves welfare. In this
experiment, we assume that the government adjusts its third instrument so as to keep real
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government transfers constant. This restriction implies:
dG/G = dpc/pc, (1.15)
where pc denotes the consumer price index.
3. Specialization in exportables
We first consider the case in which the domestic economy specializes in the production of the
tradable good for which it holds some market power. There is no home production of the other
tradable, y = 0, and total consumption of this good is imported, cy = m, see (1.11).
Obviously, this case arises if the home country has a strong comparative disadvantage in the
production of y and demand for x in the world market is relatively large. We use the log-
linearized version of the model, which is presented in this section for the case under
consideration.
3.1 Linearized model
From (1.1)-(1.3) we derive the following price equations (cf. Jones 1965): 
, (2.1)p̂n ' 2En T̂ % (1&2En)Ŵ
, (2.2)p̂x ' 2Ex T̂ % (1&2Ex)Ŵ
where 2Ej is the share of pollution costs in sector j=n,x. 
From (1.1), (1.2), (1.4), and (1.5), we derive labour market equilibrium and total
emissions:
, (2.3)8Lx x̂ % (1&8Lx) n̂ % [8Lx2ExFx%(1&8Lx)2EnFn] (T̂&Ŵ) ' 0
, (2.4)8Ex x̂ % (1&8Ex) n̂ & [8Ex(1&2Ex)Fx%(1&8Ex)(1&2En)Fn] (T̂&Ŵ) ' Ê
where 8ix denotes the share of sector x in the demand for factor i=L,E and Fj denotes the
elasticity of substitution between labor and pollution in sector j = x,n. The first two terms on
the left-hand sides capture the scale effect on factor demand, the third term captures
substitution effects induced by changes in factor prices. The right-hand side of (2.3) equals
zero due to the inelastic supply of labour.
Domestic demand can be derived from the first order conditions in (1.7). Due to our
separability assumption, the split in tradables consumption between x and y depends on
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tradables prices only according to:
, (2.5)ĉx & ĉy ' gt@ ( p̂y & p̂x )
where gt is the elasticity of substitution between the two tradables. Similarly, the share of non-
tradables consumption in total consumption depends on the relative price of non-tradables
according to:
, (2.6)ĉn & ĉ ' gd@ ( [>x p̂x % >y p̂y % >n p̂n ] & p̂n )
where gd is the elasticity of substitution between the tradables and non-tradables, and >i is the
expenditure share of good i=n,x,y in consumption, >i / pici/(pncn+pxcx+pycy). The expression
in brackets is the consumption price index . Similarly, the change in the total consumptionp̂c
index reads:
. (2.7)ĉ ' >n ĉn % >x ĉx % >y ĉy
Foreign demand follows from (1.8):
, (2.8)ĉ (x ' &gf p̂x
where gf is the price elasticity of foreign demand, that is, of exports.
Market clearing for non-tradables and tradables implies from (1.9) and (1.10):
, (2.9)n̂ ' ĉn
, (2.10)x̂ ' (1&N) ĉx % N ĉ
(
x
where N / cx
*/x is the share of foreign sales in total sales in the x sector.
The value of imports equals that of y-consumption, see (1.11) with y=0, which in turn
equals export value because of trade balance in (1.12). This gives:
. (2.11)ĉy ' ĉ
(
x % p̂x
The tariff increases the domestic price of y-goods according to (1.13), which gives:
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, (2.12)p̂y ' Jt̂
where J / t/(1+t).
The government budget constraint requires that the change in nominal tariff and tax
revenues is sufficient to make up for changes in the consumer price index to keep real income
transfers constant, see (1.14) and (1.15):
, (2.13)( (t̂ % ĉy) % (1&() (T̂ % Ê) ' >n p̂n % >x p̂x % >y p̂y
where we have substituted m = cy from (1.11) and where ( / tpy
*m/G is the share of tariff
revenue in the government budget.  
Equations (2.1)-(2.13) comprise a system of 13 equations with 13 unknowns, viz.
. The pollution tax Tp̂n , p̂x , p̂y , t̂ , Ŵ , Ê , x̂ , n̂ , ĉ , ĉn , ĉy , ĉx , ĉ
(
x
is taken as the exogenous variable that the government exogenously changes. The share
parameters are partly interdependent; in appendix A we derive how N, (, 8Ex and 8Lx are
related to 2Ex, 2En, >n, >y, and t. 
3.2. The Cobb-Douglas benchmark case.
To show the main mechanisms, we first solve the model under the assumption that substitution
elasticities in both production and domestic demand equal unity, i.e. gd=Fx=Fn=1. 
The impacts of tariffs and pollution taxes
From equations (2.1)-(2.12), we can solve for the relevant variables in terms of the tariff and
the pollution tax, that is, keeping the government budget (2.13) on the back-burner (see
appendix B). We present a few of these intermediate results to illustrate the effects of taxes and
tariffs.
The change in pollution can be written as:
 = ! gf7   + [(1!N8Lx)7 + N(8Lx!8Ex)] J (3.1)Ê T̂ t̂
where 7 / 1/[gf(1!2Ex)+2Ex]. The equation shows that pollution falls with the cost of pollution
permits. A tariff has two possibly opposing effects on pollution. A tariff reduction decreases
the demand for home-produced goods, and lowers wages to restore equilibrium in the labour
market. On the one hand, this induces substitution toward more labour-intensive production
on account of which pollution falls (see the first term in brackets in (3.1)). On the other hand,
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lower wages allow for lower export prices which stimulate foreign demand. If exports are
pollution intensive (8Ex > 8Lx) this tends to increase pollution (see the last term in brackets in
(3.1)). 
Non-tradables production and consumption is given by:
= ! gf2En7 + [(1!N8Lx)2En7 + N8Lx] J (3.2)ĉn ' n̂ T̂ t̂
Pollution taxes hurt non-tradables production. These taxes adversely affect available productive
inputs in the economy so that output of non-tradables decreases. Only if foreign demand is
completely inelastic (gf=0), output of non-tradables is isolated from environmental policy. In
the latter case, foreigners fully bear the burden of lower input availability by paying a higher
price. Tariffs shift demand toward home-produced goods and boost n-production. 
Imports, that is domestic consumption of good y, is given by:
=m̂ ' (1&gf) p̂x
= (1!gf)2Ex7 + (1!gf)(1!2Ex)(1!N8Lx)7J (3.3)ĉy T̂ t̂
When foreign demand is inelastic (gf<1), higher export prices boost export revenue (combine
(2.8) and (2.11)) which allows for a larger value of imports. Pollution taxes increase export
prices, see (1.2). Hence, if market power of the home country in the world market is large
enough it can boost imports by tightening environmental policy, see (3.3). Tariffs obviously
decrease imports. As can be checked, tariff revenue ( ) is increasing in the tariff (sot̂ % m̂
that no Laffer-curve effects arise with respect to tariffs).
The changes in prices of home-produced goods can be reduced to:
= 2Ex7     + (1!2Ex)(1!N8Lx)7J (3.4)p̂x T̂ t̂
= [2Ex!gf(2Ex!2En)]7 + (1!2En)(1!N8Lx)7J (3.5)p̂n T̂ t̂
Tariffs shift demand toward home-produced goods and raise their price. Pollution taxes
increase costs and tend to increase prices too. Also, pollution taxes shift supply toward the
labour-intensive sector. If this is the non-tradables sector (2Ex > 2En) and foreign demand
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drops significantly in response to export price increases (gf large), the relative supply of non-
tradables increases significantly (see the discussion above) and their price may have to fall in
order clear the market.
Simultaneous trade liberalization and environmental policy
If full account is taken of the government budget constraint (2.13), the effects of a tax-reform
of simultaneously increasing pollution taxes and changing tariffs can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 
Assume gd=Fx=Fn=1 (Cobb Douglas domestic demand and production) and y=0 (no
import competing production). Then a budget-neutral tax reform of increasing pollution
taxes results in lower emission levels and higher utility from private consumption if





First, substitute the above solutions (3.1)-(3.5) into the government budget constraint
(2.13). This gives:
J = ! {>y2Ex ! gf[(1!>n)2Ex + >n2En]}·'· , (3.7)t̂ T̂
where 1/'/(1!N8Lx)[(>y!gf)(1!2Ex)+>n(2En!2Ex)] + [(1!2Ex)(/t+>n+>x]/7. Since  '
> 0, the tariff falls with the pollution tax if condition (3.6) holds. 
Second, substituting (2.5), (2.12), (3.2)-(3.4), and (3.7) into (2.7), and taking into
account the relationships among the shares (see appendix A), we find the change in real
consumption:
= {>y2Ex ! gf[(1!>n)2Ex + >n2En]}·(1!2Ex)((/t)'· . (3.8)ĉ T̂
Inspection of the term in curly brackets easily reveals that private welfare increases if
(3.6) holds. 
Third, equation (3.1) reveals that pollution falls under the same condition. Note that
(by substitution of the definition of 7) the term in brackets in (3.1) can be written as
     2 See equation (3.1): M( )/M  = 72Ex(1!gf).T̂ % Ê T̂
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(1!N8Lx)(1!2Ex)(1!gf)+(1!N8Ex)/7. This term is positive for gf<1 which inequality
is implied by (3.6). Now it is clear from (3.1) that the combination of a rise in the
pollution tax and a fall in the tariff reduces emissions.
 
Since the right-hand side of (3.6) is a value between zero and one, foreign demand
should be inelastic for the private consumption to increase. As can be checked from equation
(3.1), pollution will fall also in that case so that the double dividend arises. Intuitively,
producers have to cut back on pollution which hurts output of both exportables and non-
tradables. Export revenues rise since price increases more than offset the fall in output. This
allows for larger expenditures on imports. If consumers care enough about importables relative
to non-tradables (i.e. if >y is large enough), the effect on utility of the fall in non-tradables and
exportables consumption is more than offset by the increase in imports. To find the critical





Note that there is no restriction on which of the two sectors is pollution-intensive. However,
the more polluting the export sector is relative to the non-tradables sector, the more likely a
double dividend is. Intuitively, foreigners then bear most of the adverse output effect of
environmental policy pollution reduction, while non-tradables consumption falls relatively less.
The intuition why the double dividend arises has some parallel with that in closed
economies. As Bovenberg (1995) notes, a double dividend requires some (relatively) fixed
factors in the economy that bear the burden of environmental policy. In this open economy
model, it is foreigners that bear the burden of domestic environmental policy, provided that
exports are inelastically demanded. That is, provided that export demand is a relatively fixed
factor. Indeed, if exports are absolutely fixed (gf=0), a double dividend always arises in the
open economy, see (3.9).
If export demand is elastic, exports no longer act as a relatively fixed factor. Indeed,
domestic demand is then less elastic (because of our Cobb-Douglas assumption gd=1) and
domestic residents bear the burden. With elastic foreign demand, a rise in environmental taxes
lowers export revenues (through increases in export prices). This implies a drop in national
income which results in lower private consumption. Equation (3.1) reveals why tariff
reductions cannot offset the adverse effects of pollution taxes in this case: for any increase in
the environmental tax rate, associated tax revenues fall if gf>1.
2 As a result total revenue from
     3 Calculations are based on the linearized model, that is equations (2.1)-(2.13). Unless
otherwise indicated in the graphs, in all numerical examples we have used the following
parameters: 2Ex=0.15, 2En=0.1, t=0.2, >n=>y=0.4, gf=0.4, gt=gd=Fx= Fn=1. The other
parameters (N, >x, 8Lx and 8Ex) follow from these parameters (see appendix A).
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pollution permits falls and the government has to raise tariffs in order to be able to finance the
committed transfers, see (3.7).
3.3. The role of substitution in domestic production and demand
In the previous subsection we set elasticities of substitution in domestic production and utility
equal to one. Here we consider the effects of departing from this assumption.
First, consider domestic demand. A low degree of substitution between non-tradables
and imported goods in consumers' utility (gd) makes the double dividend more likely to arise,
see Figure 1 and 2.3 Increases in pollution taxes and tariff reductions raise the price of non-
tradables relative to importables. The less consumers are willing to substitute importables for
non-tradables, the smaller the effect of the relative price change on production of non-
tradables. Hence, exportables production has to bear more of the burden of the reduction in
polluting inputs and production of exports falls more steeply. If foreign demand is inelastic,
this stimulates the value of exports more than in the case of high substitution in utility. This
explains why (as long as gf<1) the share of imports (>y) can be lower or the elasticity of
foreign demand (gf) can be higher without destroying the double dividend if consumers'
willingness to substitute is lower. The same logic applies to substitution between tradables. If
gt is small, home consumption of good x cannot fall much and the drop in production of the
good is mainly translated into a a reduction in the volume of exports. This again boosts export
revenues if gf<1.
insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 
Now, consider production. A high elasticity of substitution in production (Fx, Fn) also
increases the likelihood of a double dividend to arise (see figure 3). The more easily labour can
be substituted for emissions, the less wages will fall following a decrease in emissions. This
clearly mitigates adverse effects on private wage income so that private consumption is less
likely to fall. 
4. Import-competing production
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We now turn to the case in which the domestic economy produces in all three sectors. That is,
it produces non-tradables, exportables and import-competing goods. It trades good x for good
y in the international market, but foreign demand for the country's export good x is small
relative to home demand for y, such that imports do not match total demand for y. The
comparative advantage of the home country in good x is relatively small. We show that in this
case simultanously reducing trade tariffs and increasing pollution taxes will hurt welfare so that
the double dividend fails.
We again log-linearize the model. We need only a few equations to prove the failure
of the double dividend. Prices of domestically produced goods depend on factor prices as in
(2.1)-(2.2), and obviously a similar expression applies to y as well:
, (4.1)p̂y ' 2Ey T̂ % (1&2Ey)Ŵ
where 2Ey is the share of pollution costs in total costs. The price of the imported good is fixed
by foreign prices and tariffs as in (2.12). Substituting (2.12) into (4.1), we find:
. (4.2)Ŵ ' 1
1&2Ey
(Jt̂&2Ey T̂ )
The real wage is then given by , or, eliminating prices using (4.1):Ŵ & p̂c ' Ŵ & j >j p̂j
. (4.3)Ŵ & p̂c ' j >j2Ej (Ŵ& T̂)
We may eliminate the wage  using (4.2) which results in:Ŵ
. (4.4)Ŵ & p̂c '
j >j2Ej
1&2Ey
(J t̂ & T̂ )
This expression reveals that it is impossible for real wages to rise if tariffs are swapped for
higher pollution taxes. If pollution taxes increase and the tariff falls, the last term in
parentheses is negative and therefore the entire right-hand side is negative. Hence, we conclude
that the double dividend fails as soon as the import tariff falls on good that is also produced
in a domestic "import-competing" sector. Note that this result holds independently of the
structure of domestic or foreign demand (and thus independently of the elasticity of foreign
demand). 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. A decrease in the tariff hurts domestic
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producers in the import-competing sector. They can only stay in business if a fall in costs
suffenciently compensate for the drop in their price. Wages have to fall proportionately more
than the tariff ( , see (4.2)) since wage cost is only a fraction of total cost. Hence,Ŵ < t̂ < 0
from a consumer's perspective, real wages in terms of imported goods fall. Similarly, the
induced fall in nominal wages reduces prices in all domestic sectors, but real wages in terms
of any domestically produced good fall. Hence, consumer's real wages fall because of the tariff
reduction. On top of this comes the increase in pollution tax which raises prices of all goods
that are domestically produced with polluting inputs.
As we have seen, things are different if the tariff falls on a good that is not produced
domestically. In that case, a tariff reduction benefits consumers, and there are no import-
competing producers that would suffer from the decline in the tariff wall. In the previous
section we have shown that under these circumstances indeed a welfare improvement is
possible by swapping tariffs for pollution taxes.
5. Implications and conclusions
We have studied the effects of simultaneously liberalizing trade and tightening environmental
policy. Environmental taxes improve welfare (real consumption) in an open economy, even
ignoring benefits from reduced pollution, if the following conditions hold. First, the country
must have sufficiently large monopoly power in its export markets: goods produced abroad
must be poor substitutes for home's export goods such that export demand is inelastic. Second,
the country must have a sufficiently strong comparative advantage in the production of these
exportable goods, such that it completely specializes in exportables production and it produces
no tradables that are at the same time imported: imports must suffice to meet home demand for
other tradables. Third, the share of these importables in consumption must be relatively large,
that is, the economy must be sufficiently open to foreign trade. Finally, consumers' willingness
to substitute tradables for non-tradables should not be too large and producers' opportunities
to substitute labour for emissions not too small. Under these conditions, an increase in the
pollution tax decreases pollution, reduces home production of non-tradables and exportables,
raises export revenue (due to market power, first condition) as well as pollution tax revenue.
Given the budget-neutrality constraint, this allows for lower tariffs and higher imports. Higher
imports offset lower non-tradables and exportables consumption since importables have a large
enough weight in consumption (third condition).
In world trade, it is typically the developed countries for which the above conditions
may hold: they have market power for new high-tech goods, have a strong comparative
advantage, and import a large fraction of consumption either through intra-industry trade
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among developed countries, or through inter-industry trade with the rest of the world. In
contrast, developing countries are typically less open and lack specialization in exports with
market power. Hence, environmental policy in the North is likely to shift the terms of trade
in favour of the developed world and to shift the burden to the South, despite reductions in
import tariffs in the North. For the same reason, the South is likely to be reluctant to tighten
environmental standards without compensation from the North. 
In the introduction we pointed out the relation between our results and the double
dividend literature. Indeed we have made more precise Goulder's (1995, p.169) claim that
"[i]n certain cases an open economy can employ environmental taxes as a means of improving
its terms of trade". Our results also relate to the Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991, and Porter
and Van der Linde, 1995). We show that indeed a more stringent environmental policy may
improve competitiveness in the guise of an improved terms of trade. This argument is related
to Krutilla’s (1990) partial equilibrium analysis, to which our general equilibrium analysis is
complementary. Finally, our results can be related to the Environmental Kuznets Curve (cf.
Ansuategi et al., 1998). For poor countries environmental policy is likely to worsen welfare
so that these countries are inclined to set low environmental standards and generate high levels
of emissions. Rich countries on the other hand may benefit because they have patents for
exportables with high market power and are sufficiently open. Hence, an inverse relationship
between levels of income and emissions may emerge. 
In the tradition of the double dividend literature we have ignored the effects on utility
from the reduction in pollution. In the small open economy setting this might be especially
relevant if pollution considered is transboundary pollution that affect domestic ambient
environmental quality only to a negligible extent. In this sense the results can be applied to the
question whether unilateral environmental policy is optimal for a small open economy. A single
country has the incentive to raise environmental taxes and shift the burden to the rest of the
world, if above conditions hold. The rest of the world is not necessarily worse off despite the
fact that it consumes less of the export good of the home country which is an essential good
in utility. The rest of the world might be better off as it enjoys improved environmental
quality. However, to explore the effects on global welfare, we need a more-country analysis
(cf. De Mooij 1999, chapter 5). This is left for further research. 
15
References
Ansuategi, A. E. Barbier, C. Perrings 1998, "The Environmental Kuznets Curve", in: J. van
den Bergh and M. Hofkes (eds), Theory and Implementation of Economic Models for
Sustainable Development, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Bovenberg, A.L. 1995, "Environmental Taxation and Employment”, De Economist 143, 111-
140.
Bovenberg, A.L. and R.A. de Mooij 1994, `Environmental Taxation and the Double-
dividend: The role of factor substitution and capital mobility', in: C. Carraro and D.
Siniscalco (eds.) Environmental Fiscal Reform and Unemployment, Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic publishers, 3-52.
Goulder, L.H. 1995 `Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: a Reader's Guide',
International Tax and Public Finance 2, 157-183.
Jones, R.W. 1965 "The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models", Journal of Political
Economy 73, 557-572.  
Krutilla, K., 1991 "Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy”,Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 20, 127-142. 
Mooij, R.A. de, 1999, Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend, PhD thesis,
Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Porter, M.E. 1991 `America's Green Strategy', Scientific American 264, 168.
Porter, M.E. and C. van der Linde 1995, `Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship', Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, Number 4, 97-
118.
Smulders, J.A. 2000, ̀ Environmental Taxation in Open Economies: Trade Policy Distortions
and the Double Dividend', in: G. Schulze and H. Ursprung (eds): International
Environmental Economics: A Survey of the Issues, Oxford University Press.
16
Appendix
Appendix A. Shares (y = 0)
This appendix derives how N, (, 8Ex and 8Lx are related to 2Ex, 2En, >n, >y, and t, under the assumption
that y = 0. 
From (1.3)-(1.5) and from (1.6) and (1.14) we derive the following accounting identities respectively:
, (A.1)px x % pn n ' WL % TE / GDP
. (A.2)WL % TE % tp (y m ' pn cn % px cx % py cy / cpc















We find an expression for N / cx*px/xpx by eliminating x using (1.10), eliminating cx*px using (A.3),




























>n(1%t)2En % [>x(1%t)%>y ]2Ex
Following a similar procedure and noting from (1.3) that 1!2Ej=WLj/pjj, we find for 8Lx/Lx/L:
. (A.8)8Lx '
[>x(1%t)%>y ] (1&2Ex)
>n(1%t) (1&2En) % [>x(1%t)%>y ] (1&2Ex)
The share of the n sector in GDP can be expressed as:
, (A.9)
pn n
pn n % px x
'
pn n
pn n % px cx / (1&N)
'
>n (1%t)
(>n%>x) (1%t) % >y
where we have used the definition of N in the second equality, and the solution for N in (A.5) and the
definition of >j in the last equality.











>n (1%t)2En % [>x (1%t)%>y]2Ex
1% t (1&>y)
where we have used (1.5), the definition 2Ej = TEj/pjj, the definition of >j, and (A.9).
Using (1.12) and (A.3), we find the following expression for (:
. (A.11)( /
tp (y m















Substituting (A.4), (A.10), and the definitions of >j, we find:
. (A.12)( '
t>y
t>y % >n (1%t)2En % [>x (1%t)%>y ]2Ex
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Appendix B. Reducing the linearized model
This appendix explains how to derive (3.1)-(3.5) from (2.1)-(2.12). We first derive expressions for
relevant variables in terms of . From (2.1) and (2.2) we find:p̂x , T̂ , t̂













From (2.8) and (2.11), we find:
. (B.3)ĉy ' (1&gf ) p̂x
From (B.3), (2.5), (2.12) and our assumption gt=1, we find:
. (B.4)ĉx ' Jt̂ & gf p̂x
Substituting this result and (2.8) into (2.10), we find:
. (B.5)x̂ ' (1&N)Jt̂ & gf p̂x
From (2.5)-(2.7), our assumption gd=gt=1, and the restriction 3>j=1, we find:
, (B.6)n̂ ' ĉy % p̂y & p̂n
which reflects our Cobb-Douglas assumption which implies that expenditure shares (cnpn/cypy in this
case) are constant. Substituting (B.3) to eliminate , (2.12) to eliminate  and (B.2) toĉy p̂y
eliminate , we find:p̂n







Substitution of (B.1), (B.5) and (B.7) into (2.3) yields an equation in , from which wep̂x , T̂ , t̂
find (3.4). Now we can substitute (3.4) into (B.7), (B.3), and (B.2), to find (3.2), (3.3) and (3.5)
respectively. Finally, we find (3.1) by first substituting (B.1), (B.5) and (B.7) into (2.4), and then












g  = g  = 1td
g  = g  = 1.5td
g  = g  = 0.75td
consumption share of imports, >y
change in real consumption, c/T^ ^
Figures
Figure 1:  as function of >y for different values of gdĉ / T̂
Figure 2:  as function of gf for different values of gdĉ / T̂
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Figure 3:  as a function of gf for different values of Fn=Fxĉ / T̂
